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AN ODE TO PROBABLE CAUSE: A BRIEF
RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS AMAR AND
SLOBOGIN
SCOTT E. SUNDBY*

It is mighty hard to argue with reasonableness. Faced with
a doctrinal area as fraught with confusion as the Fourth
Amendment, thoughtful and well-articulated proposals like those
put forward by Professors Amar1 and Slobogin 2 can have an opiate-like effect. After all, a flexible "reasonableness" based
Fourth Amendment standard holds forth the promise of both accommodating a wide variety of governmental interests (ranging
from classic criminal investigations to drug testing of junior high
students) while still being able to address a myriad of concerns
about government overstepping (ranging from racially discriminatory Terry stops to misuse of high tech surveillance techniques). A "one-size-fits-all" Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard seems to offer the best of all worlds: An ability to have
an expansive Fourth Amendment that can be finely calibrated to
meet the particularities of any situation.
Let me suggest, however, that when it comes to the Fourth
Amendment there can be an unreasonable side to reasonableness, that "more can be less." It is worthwhile remembering that
the two watershed cases for the Supreme Court's gradual movement towards an all-encompassing reasonableness balancing
test-Camarav. Municipal Court' and Terry v. Ohio--were efforts to make the Fourth Amendment as expansive as the Court
thought possible under the circumstances. Camara,for the first
time, brought housing inspections within the ambit of the

1

Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law.

See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples, 72 ST.

JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998).

2 See Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation
of the
ProportionalityPrinciple,72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053 (1998).
' 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
4 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Amendment,5 and Terry ensured that "stops and frisks" were
covered by the Amendment's protections rather than left constitutionally unregulated. 6 In so doing, however, Camara twisted
the Warrant Clause into a pretzel7 and Terry unwittingly
cracked the door for a decline in the role of traditional probable
cause! Because these cases created cracks in the foundation of
Fourth Amendment safeguards, but out of a noble motive of
providing greater protection, I have called them "mischief'
cases, 9 a "mischief," I fear, that will be compounded by parts of
the proposals put forward today.
To urge caution in embracing a free-floating reasonableness
analysis is not to say that the Fourth Amendment must be
blindly enslaved to the Warrant Clause and probable cause."
The Reasonableness Clause is now an important part of Fourth
Amendment analysis and it is unrealistic and, perhaps, unwise
to urge a return to the pre-Terry days when the Reasonableness
Clause largely served as a redundant way of saying a "warrant
based on probable cause."'" One need not be a Fourth Amendment Luddite, however, to believe that if "reasonableness" is to
be applied so as to foster the Amendment's values, then certain
requirements must still be given primacy within the Fourth
Amendment framework. In other words, to acknowledge that
the Reasonableness Clause has a role within the Fourth
Amendment does not end the inquiry. What government behavior is "reasonable" under the Amendment still must be defined,
just as the "equal protection" and "due process" clauses have required further definition so that they can fulfill their purposes
and values.

'See Camara,387 U.S. at 538-40.
6 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-31.
7 See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 391-401 (1988) (critiquing the
CamaraCourt's use of the Warrant Clause as the basis for its decision).
8 See id. at 401-04.
'Id.
10 See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman" 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1796-802
(1994) (examining when Fourth Amendment analysis properly can be shifted from
Warrant to Reasonableness clauses); see also Sundby, supra note 7, at 414-27
(proposing a "composite model" of the Fourth Amendment that provides complementary roles for Reasonableness and Warrant clauses).
11See Sundby, supra note 7, at 386-91 (noting how, prior to Camara and Terry,
the Warrant Clause dominated Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
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My limited goal today is to suggest that if one looks at the
Fourth Amendment's underlying values, in particular the value
of mutual "government-citizen trust,"2 probable cause should be
viewed as a norm for a "reasonable" search or seizure. Consequently, any departures from probable cause should be deemed
"reasonable" only as limited exceptions allowed under narrow
circumstances. While there are other norms that should be included in defining "reasonableness," I focus on probable cause
because it has become the factor most at risk from the rush to
reasonableness and from the government's use of advances in
technology and surveillance."
The case which gives rise to this Symposium is a good example of how Fourth Amendment analysis can be probable-cause
centered and yet allow reasoned departures. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Terry is almost excruciatingly cautious in his effort to explain the Court's departure from a norm of probable
cause and to limit the consequences of such a departure. Reduced to its essence, the Chief Justice's holding is a relatively
modest one, basically creating a limited right of "self defense" for
a police officer who in carrying out her duties comes across
someone whom she reasonably believes is armed and dangerous." The problem with Terry, therefore, lies not in its very limited upholding of stops and frisks (a holding most of the commentators in this Symposium find acceptable 5 ). Rather, Terry's
difficulty rests in the long-term consequences it sowed by casting
the holding in terms of a broadly framed reasonableness balancing test. For although Chief Justice Warren's cautious opinion
suggests that the use of the reasonableness balancing test was
meant to be viewed as a narrow departure from the norm of
probable cause, we now know that the test has taken on a life of
its own.
Thus, I would agree with Professor Amar that there are "two
Terrys"'6-one Terry that points towards a very open-ended reasonableness approach (Professor Amar's "good Terry") and an12

Sundby, supra note 10, at 1785.

13See generally id. at 1758-63 (examining how technology has affected Fourth

Amendment analysis).
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1968).
15 For a notable dissenting voice, see Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth
Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271
(1998).
'6 Amar, supra note 1.
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other Terry that is far more cautious and restrained in recognizing departures from requiring probable cause (the "bad Terry")."
As my prior comments should make evident, though, I believe
that Professor Amar has mistaken the faces of the good and evil
twins: It is from Chief Justice Warren's cautious and thoughtful
efforts to craft a narrow exception and his recognition that such
departures carry important consequences that we should draw
our guidance.
But why is this? Why should we care whether the Fourth
Amendment universe circles around a reasonableness-balancing
test or around an analysis with probable cause at its center?
The answer largely depends upon how much individual autonomy a person should have over when the government can intrude
into their lives. The virtue of the traditional probable cause
standard is that the individual citizen maintains control over
when the government can intrude. When the probable cause
standard applies, so long as the citizen does not act in a manner
that gives rise to a "fair probability" that she is engaged in
wrongdoing, the government cannot intrude. 8 In this sense,
probable cause makes the Fourth Amendment largely selfexecuting: The government's power to search and seize does not
even exist until the citizen behaves in a manner giving rise to a
belief that she is engaged in wrongdoing.
A broadly defined reasonableness balancing test, on the
other hand, largely places the citizen's Fourth Amendment fate
in the hands of others. The citizen's freedom from intrusion now
no longer rests upon her behavior-all she wanted was a job
promotion 9 or to play sports 2 -but upon factors such as the government's ability to articulate convincing objectives, the capacity
of technology to minimize the physical intrusiveness of the invasion, and the calibration of the balancing scales used by the judiciary. 2' The citizen's Fourth Amendment fate no longer is a
factual inquiry but a policy debate.22
17

Id.

18 See

Sundby, supra note 10, at 1799.

19See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(upholding drug testing for Customs agents applying for job promotions involving
interdiction of drugs, handling of firearms, or access to classified materials).
20 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding
the random urinalysis testing of students participating in school athletic programs).
21 See Sundby, supra note 10, at 1761-63, 1798.
22 See generally id. at 1798-802.
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The difficulty with a reasonableness standard is compounded if the policy inquiry is phrased in the usual Fourth
Amendment vernacular of "privacy." Take random drug testing,
for example, and how technological advances can dramatically
alter the Fourth Amendment equation where the focus is on privacy." While courts have minimized the impact of urinalysis
drug testing on individual privacy by suggesting that it differs
little from a trip to the doctor's office for a physical,' urinalysis
still inevitably carries some of the stigma attached to invading
the privacy of performing bodily functions.2 With technological
advances, however, drug testing is now possible from a mere
snippet of hair,26 making the "privacy" comparison not even that
of a physical at the doctor's office, but of sitting in the barber's
chair and chatting about the Red Sox. In such a situation, a reasonableness balancing test which uses privacy as the primary
weight for the citizen's interest in the policy decision will obviously list heavily towards the government's interest (preventing
illegal drug use) and away from the citizen's interest (nothing
more intrusive than the clipping of a hair and perhaps discovery
that the test subject is not a true blond).
Viewing the Fourth Amendment as founded only upon privacy as a bedrock value, however, is to ignore that the Amendment is part of a larger constitutional setting.27 Once placed
within a broader context of our whole constitutional system, the
Amendment becomes much more than merely a constitutional
outpost for individual privacy. Instead, the Amendment also becomes part of the mutually reinforcing consent that flows beFor an enlightening view of where surveillance technology is headed and its
implications for the Fourth Amendment, see Christopher Slobogin, TechnologicallyAssisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft
Standards,10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383 (1997).
24 See Skinner v. Railway. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
627 (1989)
(noting that a urine sample gathering procedure is "not unlike similar procedures
encountered often in the context of a regular physical examination")
25 See id. at 626 (describing urinalysis as an "excretory function
traditionally
shielded by great privacy").
26 See, e.g., Jim O'Connell, Drug Tests for Congress: Justified or Invasion of Privacy?, CAPITAL TIMES, January 28, 1997, at A8,available in 1997 WL 7050558
(discussing the House of Representatives's possible testing of House members for
drug use through the utilization of hair samples).
27 Professor Amar has been the most influential and creative voice in
arguing
for an understanding of the Bill of Rights as an integrated part of a greater whole.
See, e.g., Alihil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1140 (1991).
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tween the citizenry and the government, a form of reciprocal
trust: The citizenry gives its consent and trust to the government to be governed and the government, in turn, trusts the citizenry to exercise its liberties responsibly.2 8 When looked at from
this more panoramic view, the importance of probable cause and
individualized suspicion to the Amendment becomes increasingly
evident. Probable cause embodies the idea of reciprocal citizengovernment trust: The citizenry is obligated to obey the government's laws, but the government may engage in intrusive activity to ensure compliance only once the citizen's behavior gives
rise to an objective belief that the trust has been violated.
This idea of trust is why probable cause must be the center
of the Fourth Amendment universe rather than, as Professor
Amar's proposal would make it, merely one satellite in orbit
around a general reasonableness balancing test. This is not to
suggest that the probable cause requirement is a panacea for all
Fourth Amendment ills, as the problem of pretextual arrests is
making increasingly clear;29 a healthy probable cause requirement will accomplish little unless all of the Fourth Amendment's
different facets, such as "reasonable expectation[s] of privacy,"
are interpreted in accord with the idea of trust of the citizenry."
Nor, as already stated, 31 is it to say that every search or seizure
must be pursuant to probable cause. It is to say, however, that
probable cause should be the Fourth Amendment norm from
which departures must be viewed as narrow exceptions that require independent justification.
Intriguingly, while much of Professor Slobogin's development of his "proportionality principle" and his emphasis on privacy as a means of implementing a reasonableness standard
gives me pause, his justification hierarchy is, in fact, rather comforting.3 2 Indeed, if Professor Slobogin's proposed hierarchy were
compared to the justifications which courts currently require for
28 See Sundby, supra note 10, at 1777-85 (developing more fully the historical

background and political theory for understanding the Fourth Amendment in terms
of reciprocal government-citizen trust).
29 See Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the
Fourth Amendment: New Strategiesfor FightingPretextualArrests, 69 U. COLO. L.
REV. 693 (1998) (noting inadequacy of traditional Fourth Amendment "vocabulary"
in dealing with issues such as pretextual arrests for traffic violations).
"0Sundby, supra note 10, at 1788-93.
3' See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
32 Slobogin, supra note 2.
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many searches, his proposed justification levels for government
intrusions would prove to be significantly more stringent. Still
worrisome, however, would be whether so many tiers of Fourth
Amendment analysis might allow future fudging with the various tiers and assessments of invasiveness, such that the actual
implementation of the proportionality standard may not correspond with Professor Slobogin's own sensibilities (with which I
generally agree).
Now that some three decades have passed since Terry and
Camara were decided, their most lasting lesson may be a need
for a healthy skepticism when "more" is promised in return for a
loosening of existing protections. In both Terry and Camara,the
dissents expressed concern that tampering with probable cause,
even if in the name of expanded coverage, may eventually provide less rather than more protection.3 Certainly the dissenters
were correct in foreseeing that the decisions would change the
nature of Fourth Amendment discourse, as Fourth Amendment
analysis increasingly
resembles that of an administrative due
4
process inquiry.
But as this Symposium well attests, for better or for worse,
Terry and Camara have become firmly woven into the Fourth
Amendment fabric. The challenge now is to ensure that the
Fourth Amendment for the next thirty years is capable of preserving its core values in the face of burgeoning regulatory
searches, expanding law enforcement surveillance, and technological advances. Can the Fourth Amendment adapt to such a
changing world? I believe that the answer is "yes," but only if we
do not lose sight of the Amendment's unchanging need of preserving trust between the government and citizenry through basic safeguards like probable cause.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 541, 547-55 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting).
' See Rosann Greenspan, CriminalDue Process in the Administrative State, 14
STUD. IN L. POL. AND SOcY 169, 193-202 (1994) (discussing the impact of the Fourth
Amendment in administrative search cases).
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